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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8684

BARTON KAY KIRKHAM,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
No one says that Barton Kay Kirkham did not kill
David Avon Frame.
We are here concerned with but two propositions which
have been advanced by counsel for defendant on this appeal:
First: Did the Court below by the giving of Instruc-

tion No. 9 exclude the element of moral wrong
from the jury's consideration; and, if so, was
the giving of the instruction erroneous?
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Second: Was error permitted by the Court below in
refusing to give to the jury defendant's requested Instruction No. 3; and, as a result
thereof, was the defendant prejudiced by the
remarks of counsel for the State during argument?
The facts presented in respondent's brief will be limited to
these issues ; we, of course, understand that on appeal involving murder it is the policy of this Court to review and
to consider the entire record for error whether cited or not.
We are confident that if there were possible further contentions for error eminent counsel for appellant would have
claimed for it. We point to none.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are not in dispute.
The Court instructed the jury, in part, as follows:

"INSTRUCTION 9
"The defendant, in his defense, has pleaded and
contends that he is not guilty of any crime charged
in the Information, because, at the time the act was
committed, he, the defendant, was insane.
"Insanity may be a complete defense to a criminal act, or it may reduce the degree of offenses, or
it may have no bearing upon the question of guilt.
"Insanity is an element in determining questions of guilt of or punishment for crime only when
it renders the person so affected irresponsible or
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partly irresponsible. That is, the defendant cannot
be convicted of a crime, if, at the time of the act,
he was insane to such an extent that he did not know
the nature of the act; that is, did not know he had
a revolver, that it may be loaded, or that, if discharged, it might injure or kill; OR that, when he
fired the shot, he did not know it was wrong in the
sense that such act was condemned by morals or
law; OR that he was unable, by reason of mental
disease, to control his actions or impulses to injure
or kill David Avon Frame.
"If defendant was afflicted with a disease of the
mind, at the time of the alleged offense in any one
or more of these three manners, then, in such case,
he was not legally responsible and is entitled to an
acquittal" (Tr. 252).
It is contended that your appellant was incapable of understanding the moral implications of his conduct and that
the instruction, supra, precluded the jury from considering
the evidence presented in support thereof. But that under
the instruction given the jurors were required to find only
that appellant was of sufficient mentality to know that his
act was against the law; that the "morality requirement"
in application of the right and wrong test was denied recognition.
The Court refused to give appellant's requested Instruction No. 3, as follows:

"INSTRUCTION NO. 3
"The State of Utah has a mental hospital where
patients who are suffering from mental illness may
be incarcerated and treated for such time as is con-
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sidered by a court of competent jurisdiction to be
necessary" ( Tr. 266) .
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT'S CAUSE.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.3.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT'S CAUSE.

"INSTRUCTION 9
"The defendant, in his defense, has pleaded and
contends that he is not guilty of any crime charged
in the Information, because, at the time the act was
committed, he, the defendant, was insane.
"Insanity may be a complete defense to a criminal act, or it may reduce the degree of offenses, or
it may have no bearing upon the question of guilt.
"Insanity is an element in determining questions of guilt of or punishment for crime only when
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it renders the person so affected irresponsible or
partly irresponsible. That is, the defendant cannot
be convicted of a crime, if, at the time of the act,
he was insane to such an extent that he did not know
the nature of the act; that is, did not know he had
a revolver, that it may be loaded, or that, if discharged, it might injure or kill; OR that, when he
fired the shot, he did not know it was wrong in the
sense that such act was condemned by morals or
law; OR that he was unable, by reason of mental
disease, to control his actions or impulses to injure
or kill David Avon Frame.
"If defendant was afflicted with a disease of
the mind, at the time of the alleged offense in any
one or more of these three manners, then, in such
case, he was not legally responsible and is entitled to
an acquittal" (Tr. 252).
The adverse criticism made of the instruction is that
the use of the disjunctive "or" instead of "and" between
the words "morals" and "law" instructs the jury that if
Kirkham knew that his acts were against the law he was
legally sane. There has long been a question as to whether,
under the M'Naghten test, "right and wrong" means legally
or morally, right or wrong; it has been written on this
subject:

"* * * The judges in M'Naghten's Case apparently took the view that the knowledge of right
and wrong involved in that test was a knowledge as
to whether the act committed was wrong by the law
of the land, stating, in answer to the first question
as to the effect of an insane delusion, that the act
would be punishable according to the nature of the
crime committed, although committed in consequence
of such a delusion, if the accused knew at the time
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of committing the crime that he was acting contrary
to the law of the land.
"And the argument that under the rule the term
"right and wrong, should be taken in the moral
rather than in the legal sense was rejected in Reg.
v. Windle [1952] 2 QB 826, [1952] 2 All Eng. 1, the
court saying that the law could only distinguish between that which was in accordance with law and
that which was contrary thereto.
"In United States v. Smith (1954) 5 USCMA
314, 17 CMR 314, it was said that an accused's notion that an act was morally right, although he realized its legal wrongfulness, would not constitute
a defense under the 'right-and-wrong' test as applied
in the military establishment.

"Knowledge that the act committed was a violation of the criminal law was held in McElroy v. State
(1922) 146 Tenn. 442, 242 SW 883, to be sufficient
to justify holding the accused responsible. The court
held that the accused's delusion that the killing in
question had been directed by God was not sufficient
to excuse him in view of the showing that he knew
it was against the law, saying that it was no new
thing for criminals to attempt to justify their conduct upon the excuse that they had acted on a divine
command, but that men cannot put themselves beyond the reach of the law by the indulgence of such
vain imaginations.
"And in Ha.rrison. v. Sta.te (1902) 44 Tex. Crim.
164, 69 SvV 500, one who committed bigamy under
the delusion that the act had been directed by a
vision from God was held to be responsible, where
he admittedly knew, at the time, that his act was
punishable by the law of the state.
"However, the case of Bergin v. Stack [1952]
Austr. LT 810, as stated in the Eng. & Emp. Dig.,
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3d Cum. Supp. 1955, holds that in certain criminal
cases the test of insanity is whether the accused
knew that his act was wrong according to the standards of reasonable men, not whether he knew it
was wrong as being contrary to law.
"And in People v. Schmidt (1915) 216 NY 324,
110 NE 945, LRA 1916D 519, Ann. Cas. 1916A 978,
the court took the view that the wrong contemplated
by the M'Naghten test is moral and not legal wrong."
[Anno. 45 ALR 2d 1447, 1454.]
Instruction No. 9 was given as a mimeographed "stock" instruction. The wording thereof is as suggested by this
Court in State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P. 2d 177, 184; (see
also the recent (1956) case of State v. Riggle, 298 P. 2d 349,
367) and, of the identical instruction this Court has said:

"* * * The * * *
cise and correct statement of
case in hand. State v. Green
[State v. Green, 86 U. 192, 40

instruction is a conlaw applicable to the

* * *"
P. 2d 961.]

The rule as laid down by the Court in the M'Naghten
case has been widely adopted and is, we think, the established law of this jurisdiction. State v. Green (both cases),
supra; 45 ALR 2d at 1452-3. This Court has recognized
both of the tests laid down by M'N aghteri's case, and has
held that a person is not criminally responsible where he
does not know the nature and quality of his act as well as
not knowing right from wrong. State v. Brown, 36 U. 46,
102 P. 641; State v. Green, supra. This Court has also recognized the "irresistible· impulse" modification of the M'Naghten rule. State v. Green, supra. Your appellant now
asks this Honorable Court to further revise the rule by
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adopting the minority views expressed in People v. Schmidt,
216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916D 519, Ann. Cas.
1916A 978; i. e., the view that the wrong contemplated by
the M'Naghten test is moral but not legal wrong. Or, in
the alternative, we opine, seek to have the Court declare
that a defendant must [to be criminally responsible] know
that the act complained of was legally and morally wrong.
We think the rule best left as it is; that the jury's inquiry
of the defendant should be, first, was the act committed
wrong by the law of the land; second, did the defendant
know the nature and quality of his act so as to be criminally
responsible therefor, recognizing and applying the "irresistible impulse" test to the latter inquiry. Instruction No.
9 is clear and concise as to these tests ; if a defendant be
so insane that he does not know his act to be against law,
then he cannot be criminally responsible and his moral
outlook becomes as nothing. Legal insanity is a disorder of
intellect. Moral insanity is a disorder of the feelings and
propensities. The first is a defense, the second an excuse,
a reason for wrongdoing, nothing more. To rationalize
otherwise would be to sanction such crimes as polygamy as
'veil as murder and make enforcement of la-\v dependent
upon individual moral concept.
May we say, not facetiously, that in giving full weight
to all of the Court's instructions the jurors took little notice
of the "or", used in place of the "and" between the words
"moral" and "law" in Instruction No. 9. The word "or" is
frequently misused. (Blacks La'v Dictionary. Fourth Edition.) The jury found your appellant capable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the particu-
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lar act complained of and the rules governing the insanity
defense in this jurisdiction.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.3.
Your appellant requested of the Court the following
instruction:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 3
"The State of Utah has a mental hospital where
patients who are suffering from mental illness may
be incarcerated and treated for such time as. is considered by a court of competent jurisdiction to be
necessary.''
The requested instruction was not predicated on or applicable to the issues presented by the pleadings and the
evidence and therefore it was erroneous and properly refused. State v. Dubois, (Utah) 98 P. 2d 354; State v.
Marasco, 17 P. 2d 919, 81 Utah 325; State v. Anderson, 100
Utah 468, 116 P. 2d 968; State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113,
170 P. 2d 153; State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P. 2d 478;
see also 23 C. J. S. Criminal Law, Sec. 1310, page 902, and
supplement. In State v. Thompson, supra, this Court said:
"We have repeatedly criticized the giving of
abstract statements of the law to the jurr, and held
that it is the duty of the court to apply the law to
the facts supported by the evidence and to not in-
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struct on any question which is not involved in the
case under the evidence."
[Utah authorities there cited.]
In State v. Riggle, Wyo. 1956, supra, it was held that the
power of the Board of Pardons was not pertinent to the
issues and that is was proper not to instruct the jury thereon. We see an anology.
Appellant claims for his requested instruction under
authority of 64-7-36 (Subsection G), U. C. A. 1953, this
statute is not for application in a criminal cause; where a
verdict is returned of not guilty by reason of insanity the
Court proceeds and makes its determination under 77-24-14,
Code of Criminal Procedure, U. C. A. 1953. Be that as it
may, your appellant appears to concede that there was no
admitted evidence pertaining to incarceration .for insanity
or discharge of the defendant upon return of a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity. Of the District Attorney's
statement they say :

"* * * It was not founded on any evidence
introduced by either party. * * *"
(Appellant's brief, p. 25.)
If so the above authorities, cited for the rule that the instruction was properly refused for want of applicability to
the issues presented by the evidence, are controlling.
Appellant's argument under Point II of his brief conc-erns itself more pointedly to the conduct and remarks of
the District .Attornev than to the contended error of the
Court in refusing the requested instruction. We are not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

prepared to say that the contention raised for appellant is
not without merit ; we find ourselves concerned over the
propriety of the remarks complained of, however, we here
claim, upon the record, for no prejudicial error. If, as appellant contends, it was in fact anticipated by counsel that
the District Attorney might claim that a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity would result in the defendant
being "turned loose" it might have been best had they consulted the Court prior to arguments as to their concern.
An objection to the initial remark concerning the subject
matter would also have been proper. Factually, however,
it ·~ould seem that counsel for the defendant "wielded the
shield into a sword" and therewith struck many telling
blows for the defense. Appellant complains of the District
Attorney as follows :
"The District Attorney did in fact state in his
opening argument to the jury: 'Should you acquit
him, he would be turned loose' (R. 204). Again in
his rebuttle argument Mr. Anderson belabored at
great length the proposition that defendant would
be turned loose if found not guilty by reason of insanity" (R. 231, 232).
(Appellant's brief, p. 25.)
For what the District Attorney uttered we turn to the
:record, opening argument:
"* * * It seems to me that the essence of
this case is found in what we see in the testimony
of the doctor, when he said every man who commits
a killing or a murder-every man is-either does it
because of neurosis, psychosis-which is a mental
disease of one sort or another-or psychopathic personality, which is not insanity-which is a character
disorder.
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"And the defendant in this case is not one of
the first two groups and would not be hospitalized,
according to the report which the doctor returned.
Should you acquit him, he would be turned loose.
* * *" (Tr. 204).
Closing argument:
"* * * Counsel has accused me of misleading you, and I refer now to the instructions, so that
I may make no mistake and may correct any misimpression which they may have left with you.
"Defense said they don't want to turn this boy
loose on society, and they have said I have misled
you ; and nothing is farther from the truth, if, by a
verdict of not guilty, you are led to believe that he
may go free.
"The doctor here who has examined him has
said that, in his examination which took place after
this incident-counsel queried him and asked him
if his examination did not include a consideration of
the events of this night, and he said it did. The
doctor went on to say that hospitalization at this
time is not indicated, and I think that was his response in the report to the court.
"You interpret that--and you have the right;
you have heard him. What is your conclusion? If
it isn't hospitalization on a plea--or on a verdict of
not guilty-what is it? Where \Vould you stand?
"Then, consider next with regard to this question of insanity; counsel says, ''Ve are not asking
you to turn him loose on society.' That was Mr.
Duncan, but. then. Mr. Black gets up and he argues
Instruction No. 10 to you, which says that the defendant-legal insanity is-'the test in determining
legal insanity is not whether the defendant, at the
time of committing the offense, knew what he was
doing. but whether the defendant \¥as in such mental
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condition as to be able to distinguish between right
and wrong in reference to the particular act complained of.
" 'In this connection, you are instructed that the
State of Utah has the burden of proving to your
minds beyond all reasonable doubt that defendant
was sane at the time of killing David Avon Frame,
and, if the State has failed to sustain this burden,
you must find defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.'
"If he was legally insane, as they seem to be
arguing with you, in support of the plea of 'not
guilty by reason of insanity,' if Mr. Black wants you
to believe that this is insanity, as he so positively
declares the doctor said, aren't they, then, asking
you for a verdict of not guilty? If they ask you not
to turn him loose on society, they are asking you for
a verdict other than not guilty, and, if they are asking you for a verdict other than not guilty, then they
don't believe themselves-their argument on legal
insanity-and, furthermore, the doctor did not say
that this man was legally insane. He said that there
are three categories into which a murderer falls,
and he repeated them-psychosis, neurosis, or psychopathic personality; and the defendant is neither
or the first two; the defendant is the third ; and,
with respect to the third, he said every murder in
cold blood, and murder, except police and military
in war, is abnormal.
"The cold-blooded murder is an abnormal act,
and that every criminal, generally speaking, may
be classified as either 'moderate' or 'severe' character disorder. Are we to excuse them all, then,
because they have character disorder? Is that the
purport of the defense? He said, even they would
not turn the defendant free. * * *"
(Tr. 231, 232, 233.)
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Counsel for the defense countered the above arguments as
follows:
LaMar Duncan, Esq.:

'' * * * Might I say, right in the beginning,
that we are not interested in-in any way, in your
releasing this boy on society. Mr. Black and I, right
from the beginning, have been very frank; we have
been very open with His Honor and with you. We
have not withheld anything, and we haven't tried to
tell you anything that wasn't so. We have been just
as fair as we know how in the defense of this young
boy.
"Now, where are these sources that come to
make up this boy's thinking?
"And, while counsel is talking about 'justice,'
I want to tell you that he misled you; that that man
told you something that wasn't true. He told you
that the doctor here-and the doctor was fair, he
was called by both sides. He did say-and I submit
to you the record-ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
he did say that a character disorder was a mental
disorder. He wants to categorize in some sort of
way so he can get over this thing.
"He is just blood-thirsty; that is all he has got
in mind. I have practiced law for over twenty-three
years, and I have never seen a prosecutor that would
deliberately go out of his way to try to mislead.
That was a deliberate attempt to mislead you, and
I think you all got it. I think you heard what that
doctor said ; that doctor went into great detail, and
this is what he said :
"He said a person with this kind of mind, he
would feel in his own way that he was justified in
what he did. He said he would have a build-up inside of him-a tension-that was built up, and, as
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a result of that tension, he just reacted in a certain
fashion, and that was all there was to it.
"Now, this is a terrible thing. I am not trying
to minimize the thing that happened, nor am I trying to tell you that it is a small matter. It is a matter of deep concern, and I have said-and I repeat
right at the outset-that we are not asking you, in
any manner, to release this boy on society. That
has never been our intention. * * *
(Tr. 209, 210, 211.)
"* * * Now, we have raised this question of
insanity, not for any purpose of releasing this boy
on society-a 19-year-old boy.
"Counsel comes in and he yells for blood. He
wants you, ladies and gentlemen, to forget all Christian principles that you have. He wants you to
revert to the old savage Mosiac law in this case, of
an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. He wants
to have the life of this boy. * * *
(Tr. 213.)
"* * *
"I am reading Instruction No. 17 :

" 'If you find the defendant guilty of murder
in the first degree, it will then be your duty to determine whether you will recommend that he be
imprisoned for life at hard labor. If you do not
make this recommendation, the court, under the law,
has no alternative but to impose a sentence of death.
If you do make this recommendation, the court is
given the discretion of sentencing defendant either
to life imprisonment at hard labor or death.'
"In other words, his Honor himself would take
upon himself that responsibility.
" 'The making or withholding of the foregoing
recommendation is a matter entirely within your
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discretion to be exercised in any manner and for
any reason you see fit, and you must not take anything that may or may not have been said or done
by this court as any intimation of the court as to
what should or should not control or influence you
in reaching a conclusion on this matter.'
"Now, we are confronted with, what are we
going to do? I have said, and repeat, that we, in no
way, want you, or desire that you, should turn this
boy loose on society; * * *
"He has said-his Honor has told you in this
instruction that you can make than recommendation.

* * *
(Tr. 214, 215.)
"* * *
"It isn't much I am asking for. We are not
asking-! repeat again-asking you to turn this boy
loose, but I am asking you to give her just a ray of
hope-that which the Master gave all of us-that
she might, on Christmas morning, have a hope of
life. It may be life behind four walls and for the rest
of his life; and that in itself-that is your prerogative ; but, again, I plead with you to give this boy
-to spare his life--if not for his sake, for the sake
of this boy's mother, who has already been through
a thousand hells as she sat here. * * *"

(Tr. 217.)
Wayne L. Black, Esq.:
"* * *
"Counsel makes another remark that I want to
refer to: 'If you acquit him, he will be turned loose.'
That is as far from the fact as anything that could
possibly be said in this court here today. Counsel
knows, and you know, that determination of insanity-determinations of whether a person should be
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incarcerated in mental institutions-.are matters for
the court, to be determined according to the court's
dictates and the court's decisions.
"I say to you, there isn't anything this jury can
do today that would turn this boy loose on society.
There is no verdict you could render that would turn
him loose on society. Your decision is going to determine one of three things : Either he is going to
go into a mental institution-and Dr. Nelson said
that this would require in-patient treatment over
a long period of years; didn't you hear him say that?
"Either he is going into a mental institution,
or he is going out to the State Prison for the rest of
his life, or he is going to stand before a firing squad
for the commission of this offense.
"Those are the three, and only three, alternatives that stand in the way of this boy's life at this
cross-roads of his life. Now, I want that to be indelibly and crystally-clear before the court and jury.
He is not going to be turned free on society, regardless of what anyone does.
"* * *
"Now, it is the law that, if you should return
a verdict of first degree murder-and I say God
forbid that you do-if you should return a verdict
of first degree murder in this case, you have the
further responsibility of determining whether or not
to recommend leniency. If you do not recommend
leniency, the court has no choice, no discretion but
to sentence this boy to go out some cold, early morning, and to face a firing squad, or to face a hangman's noose. If you do recommend leniency, then,
of course, the responsibility is with the court to
further deliberate and determine whether his punishment shall be life imprisonment or shall be death
at the hands of an executioner. * * *"
(Tr. 225, 226, 227.)
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So far as the pleadings and the evidence in this matter are
concerned, both counsel for prosecution and defense were
probably "out of bounds." From the entire proceedings and
remarks made it is evident that the jury could not have
possibly been misled and the defendant's cause was not
prejudiced.
We contend that the evidence of defendant's guilt and
sanity was so clear and convincing that no reasonable jury
could be expected to return a different verdict, even in the
absence of the irregularities, and the error complained of,
if any, was harmless. State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 244,
282 P. 2d 323, 332. If this is not a case where capital punishment should be imposed, then such punishment might
well be eliminated from our statute books.
CONCLUSION
The verdict should be permitted to stand.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Deputy Attorney General,
Atto1~~eys for

Respondent.
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